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Abstract   Many countries are exploring alternative strategies to counter rising flood risk as there is 
concern at the extra burden that such increasing risk will bring. The aim of this paper is to explore 
the nature of these burdens, and outline responses in the United Kingdom where both the 
government and the private flood insurers have new policies and proposals. Our method is to collate 
the extensive existing authoritative data and information - from government and the insurance 
industry - about the risks that are being experienced and the related policy responses. The results 
show that these seek to concentrate somewhat more the financial burden of, respectively, flood risk 
management costs and insurance provisions on to those who are at risk and away from the general 
taxpayer and those who pay insurance premiums. Other countries may well learn from these 
developments. The pre-existing cross-subsidies are being reduced and, in this way, it is hoped that 
extra resources for risk management investment will be forthcoming (from local contributions from 
at-risk communities) and flood insurance will remain affordable, available and commercially viable. A 
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key conclusion here is that it appears that any increase in flood frequency and severity in the UK 
appears likely to affect the financially deprived communities to a greater extent than others, not 
least because they are less likely to insure. Government arrangements to prioritise their contribution 
to risk reducing towards these financially deprived communities is a sign that this regressive effect of 
floods is real and serious, and those arrangements are to be welcomed. 
 
Keywords Flooding; adaptation; insurance; investment; policy; United Kingdom.
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Sharing the burden of adapting to increasing flood risk: who pays for 
flood insurance and flood risk management investment in the United 
Kingdom 
1.  Introduction  
The burden of flooding appears to be increasing for many communities around the world 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2013) owing to socio-economic change, demographic 
movements, and climate change leading to sea level rise and possible increased fluvial and pluvial 
flooding. Not only is the probability of flooding likely to be increasing, but so also are its 
consequences for those affected (Samuels and Gouldby 2009), although important uncertainties 
surround both determinants of risk. 
 
The aim of this paper is, first, to address the question of who carries the burden of this increasing 
risk and, secondly, how this fits alongside the burden already felt by communities affected by 
current flood frequencies and severities. Rather than collect new data ourselves the method of 
analysis whereby we address this question is to collate the extensive existing authoritative data and 
information - from government and the insurance industry - about the risks that are being 
experienced and the related policy responses. The policies that we are principally concerned with 
here are, first, the provision in the United Kingdom (UK) of flood risk management (FRM) investment 
and the reduction of risk that this provides through structural and non-structural interventions, and, 
secondly, the recompense of those suffering damage or incurring other losses from flooding, either 
through flood insurance (as in the UK) or through compensation schemes, the latter largely provided 
by governments elsewhere. Our investigation’s objective here is to identify possible changes in the 
burden of flooding going forward, and their likely consequences. 
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In this respect we examine insurance and related measures because they can be an effective 
mechanism assisting adaptation to increasing levels of risk, if policy and practice are sufficiently 
geared in that direction, but the burdens are not evenly distributed (Priest et al. 2005; O’Neil and 
O’Neil 2012). The same applies to flood risk management investment: this should reduce risk or hold 
it at current levels, but it is generally expensive and because it is usually funded from general 
taxation it has substantial distributional consequences: the burden again falls unevenly (Penning-
Rowsell and Pardoe 2012a, 2014). 
 
The analysis reported here is concerned mainly with United Kingdom, but this is to be seen within an 
international context whereby many countries are seeking to adapt to increased flood risk by 
implementing new or adapted insurance regimes (Lamond and Penning-Rowsell 2014). Moreover we 
believe that some of the lessons learnt here have more general applicability, not least in other 
European countries seeking under the EU Floods Directive 2007 (EU Directive 2007/60/EC) to 
develop their flood risk management plans or contemplating flood insurance as a risk managing 
measure. Set within that context of international experience in this field, we build on previous 
research that quantifies the costs and benefits of flood risk management for different communities 
(Penning-Rowsell and Pardoe 2012b), analyses of related justice issues (Johnson et al. 2007; Walker 
and Burningham 2011), and research on the consequences of moving towards risk-reflective pricing 
of insurance products (Pardoe et al. 2013; Penning-Rowsell and Pardoe 2014). We also draw here on 
the latest flood risk assessments for the UK and two new policy initiatives which could crucially 
affect the burden that the risk of flooding imposes upon different groups within our society.   
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2.  Ideas and international experience 
2.1 The nature of flood-related burdens 
Table 1 outlines the four key burdens that we see as being associated with flooding: (A) flood risk; 
(B) financing flood risk management; (C) the recovery from flooding and (D) the responsibility for 
flood risk management decision-making. The Table also gives examples of how these different 
burdens may be spread across society along burden-sharing spectra; examples from different 
countries will sit somewhere along these ranges. In this respect we see that such burdens may be 
financial as well as non-financial (e.g. the burden of the responsibility for decision-making) and are 
distributed amongst different groups in society, almost invariably unequally. The financial burdens 
include how flood risk management measures are funded and how communities and individuals 
recover the losses they incur in floods.   
 
Table 1 should be inserted about here. 
 
Elaborating on Table 1 (A), at the most basic level the flood risk itself is a key burden associated with 
flooding, the effects of which are not evenly distributed across society:   some communities and 
properties are more at risk than others or are more vulnerable (Walker and Burningham 2011; 
O’Neil and O’Neil 2012).  Individuals who experience flooding have the heaviest emotional and often 
financial burden to carry, including the strains of losing their possessions and the cost of the 
restoration of their properties following a flood (Tapsell et al. 2009).  However, the emotional and 
financial burden of individuals can be positively or negatively impacted by how floods are managed 
and whether recovery is assisted and assisted quickly.  Equally, those living in areas of flood risk may 
continue to live with the uncertainty about whether a flood will occur in the future and, for some, 
the associated anxiety may continue to be a burden long after a flood has been experienced (Tapsell 
et al. 2002).    
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Other groups also shoulder some of the loads associated with flood risk.  These groups may include 
general taxpayers who contribute financially to flood risk management (Table 1, B) and recovery 
activities (Table 1, C) via paying their taxes, whether or not they benefit from the expenditure that 
results.  There are also insurers and their shareholders who risk financial losses if claims exceed 
income, but who also assist those who experience flooding in supporting flood-event recovery with 
compensatory payouts (Table 1, C). Taxpayers also have this burden if recovery is funded by the 
state through some form of solidarity scheme whereby all assist the few. 
 
Although flood risk is fundamentally associated by the physical environment (e.g. the proximity of a 
property to a river or coast) the burden of that risk may be redistributed by flood risk management 
decisions and measures, and communities with similar flood risks may be treated differently and 
protected to different standards.  The extremes here might be a concentration on defending against 
flooding, with low residual risk, whereas another approach might focus on assisting communities to 
be resilient and live with rather than reduce their flood risk. Both situations are illustrated with one 
example.  In The Netherlands the traditional stance within the dike rings is a universally high 
protection standard (of 1:10,000 years), and although there is movement towards multi-layered 
safety and hence other more adaptable forms of flood risk management this overarching standard of 
protection remains.  However, for those at risk from flooding outside of these areas there is not the 
same norm: here there is more of an emphasis on living with the flood risk. 
   
Therefore another burden relates to managing flood risk and making decisions about how this risk 
might be mitigated:  taking ownership of the flooding issue and incurring the burden of making flood 
risk management decisions that inherently advantage some groups over others (Table 1, D).  This can 
also be seen as a spectrum, ranging between centralised decision-making whereby flood risk 
management decisions are taken by nationally based trained flood professionals (as in the UK in the 
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past (Penning-Rowsell et al. 1986)), to decisions being the sole responsibility of the at-risk property 
owner (now being encouraged by the UK government (Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (Defra) 2004)).  Politicians are also responsible for decisions about funding and the powers 
given to the institutions involved in flood risk management. Local flood managers have the burden 
of delivering flood mitigation measures on the ground. In reality, responsibility for decision-making 
will lie somewhere along the ranges shown in Table 1 (D), and where this involves some degree of 
stakeholder engagement this spreads somewhat the decision-making burden.  
 
The spreading of the different flood burdens listed in Table 1 across society varies internationally. 
Some countries mainly place the decision making burden on the individual at-risk property owners 
or communities, whereas others have high levels of government intervention. Differences here 
generally depend on how flood risk management is conceived, organised and funded: the overall 
philosophy, or approach.  In this respect the different flood mitigation measures can be divided into 
those approaches which prioritise preventative strategies and those which are more reactive. These 
two approaches bring both different burdens and involve different people and communities carrying 
those burdens, as discussed below. 
 
2.2  Preventative action: the burden of financing flood risk management investment 
There are various ways to fund flood risk management and spread its cost burden.  On one end of 
the spectrum is a national-solidarity philosophy, in which flood burdens are carried on a relatively 
equal basis by the majority, irrespective of risk exposure (Table 1, B). A clear example of this is the 
use of public money (gathered via some degree of general taxation) to manage flood risk.  At the 
opposite end is the situation whereby flood risk management is funded by those who directly 
benefit from its measures and the consequent reduction in the flood risk they enjoy as individuals or 
communities.  The arguments here are related to notions of fairness and equity, as where funding is 
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driven by a philosophy of solidarity decisions will inevitably need to be about where limited 
resources are deployed and some communities will benefit and others will not (see HR Wallingford 
2008; Johnson et al. 2007; Penning-Rowsell and Pardoe 2012a, b).    
 
In addition to who is paying for flood risk management activities, there is also the issue of the 
instruments by which these funds are raised.  For instance, it is possible to have two quite different 
systems based on the principle of beneficiary pays.  One approach would be to expect individual 
households to purchase their own property-level flood risk management solutions, whereas another 
may collect a levy or tax from only those at risk from flooding and use these resources to fund only 
the reduction of their flood risk.   
 
Different approaches and decisions may be purely a question of financing and because they are 
considered to be the most efficient way of undertaking flood risk management, or there may be a 
more ideological element in placing the burden of funding on those directly benefiting from flood 
risk management and away from the predominantly risk-free general taxpayer.  
 
The majority of systems in Europe have some government intervention in flood risk management 
financing; it is the degree to which this is spread towards those at risk of flooding that differs.  For 
instance, Garrelts and Lange (2011) describe the funding for coastal protection schemes in Germany 
which are primarily 50% funded by the Federal government and 50% by the Länder or at a regional 
government level.  In The Netherlands, there appears to be a great deal of national solidarity in 
relation to flood risk management and much importance is placed upon maintaining high protection 
standards of defence for all, which in turn requires relatively large amounts of expenditure.  Van 
Rijswick and Havekes (2012) report that approximately €6.5 billion annually are spend on water 
management; however only a small part of this is generated at a national level via general taxation. 
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The majority of funding for Netherland flood risk management in is gathered by the local Water 
Boards and specific water management taxes (specifically through Inhabitant, Property and Pollution 
taxes) payable by those residing within the control and area of each board.  Yet standards are 
nationally determined.  
 
In Austria, the burden of flood risk management is spread more widely.   Austrian flood risk 
management authorities have reported annual average spending of €220 million on flood protection 
(Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft 2006).  The sum 
comes 60% from Federal (national) funds, 23% from contributions by the federal provinces and the 
final 17% from stakeholder contributions, although the actual contributions made by the Federal and 
regional government and by private companies and communities may vary for different schemes.  So 
although taxpayers are making a large contribution, the stakeholders who benefit directly from flood 
risk management measures are also responsible for shouldering a large proportion of flood risk 
management costs. 
 
There may also be a difference in philosophy between the funding of collective measures (whether 
this is national, regional or local level funding) and individual flood defence measures.  This may be 
partly a technical decision based upon the potential solutions available or a more preference-led 
decision based upon the preferred type of flood risk management (protection-based or more 
resilience oriented).  In many European countries there is a movement away from large-scale 
structural defences towards flood risk management measures which are considered to be more 
resilient and sustainable (e.g. Defra 2004; Bavarian State Ministry of the Environment 2006; 
Ministeri van Loudbouw et al. 2006).  This move away from major engineering schemes potentially 
shifts a greater burden for financing flood risk management on to those at risk rather than the 
general taxpayer.   
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However, this is not always the case.  In England and Wales there have been a number of pilot 
projects which financially assisted at-risk individuals in implementing property level protection 
through either a part-contribution or covering the full cost of measures (Harries 2009; Merritt 2012). 
But this was a small scale initiative, with less than 2,000  properties assisted, such that the overall 
impact on at-risk properties generally was very limited (Wicks et al. 2012).  Property-level measures 
continue primarily to be funded by private companies or households with the property-owner alone 
shouldering the burden of financing their own risk mitigation owing to a lack of action or finance 
from regional or national governments. 
 
2.3  Reactive measures: the burdens of compensation or  flood insurance 
We see reactive approaches to burden sharing as including the financing of post-event recovery. The 
spectrum in this case (Table 1, C) again varies from a national-solidarity approach where all recovery 
comes from the State and one in which individuals have to finance their own recovery.   Priest (2003) 
broadly divides recovery from losses into the following types: loss bearing; loss sharing; 
compensation; and charitable and international aid.  These options vary according to the directness 
of financial input by the individual affected, with loss bearing being the closest and international aid 
being the furthest from the individual. In some countries there is little formal assistance following 
flood events and the majority of the loss falls upon individuals and communities (risk-bearing).  Table 
2 gives international examples of the type of flood insurance and compensation approaches as 
analysed from a range of different sources (Gaschen et al. 1998; Michel-Kerjan 2001; Fiselier and 
Oosterberg 2004; Comité Européen des Assurances 2005; Consorcio de Compensacion de Seguros 
2008; Porrini and Schwarze 2014).   In these examples, the role of the state varies from very little 
intervention (e.g. UK) to a fully state-implemented insurance scheme (e.g. United States of America) 
and to recovery mainly implemented by compensation (e.g. Netherlands).  In the case of 
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compensation and government assistance following flooding, society as a whole contributes through 
taxes. If a commercial market provides insurance then participants provide these payments through 
their premiums.   
 
Table 2 should be inserted about here. 
 
What is of primary concern here is the balance between different levels of individual loss bearing 
and more structured mechanisms designed to provide financial recompense. Internationally, there is 
also a difference between those countries which have developed compensation approaches to 
recovery and those who have employed insurance approaches and the benefits and limitations can 
vary.  The private insurance market is often seen as the most effective and most efficient way in 
which to provide insurance and recovery from flooding and other natural perils (Botzen and van den 
Bergh 2008). Insurance provided in this way reduces the burden on governments and the need to 
provide recompense via taxation because the premiums charged should be sufficient to cover the 
losses generated. Ideally, this approach also has the advantage that it places the onus for financial 
recovery on the individual at risk and has the potential to incentivise self-help flood mitigation and 
less risky behaviour. 
 
However, there are also many international examples of compensation funds to assist in the 
financial recover of individuals from flooding.   It is important to stress the difference between the 
more formal state compensation schemes (e.g. Austria) which have defined those natural perils 
which are included, have clear procedures in place and have a formalised mechanism for claiming 
assistance, and those where emergency legislation ex-post is introduced on a case-by-case basis 
following a disaster (e.g. Germany; Italy).  Although in many cases individuals may be compensated 
in similar ways, expectations of the State may differ considerably and there will be less certainty 
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about whether victims will receive any financial assistance when the case-by-case approach is 
adopted.  
 
There is also a difference between those recovery systems which are financed in advance of flooding 
(or other natural events) (e.g. Austria) and those where funds are collected ex-post.  The arguments 
between structural versus ad hoc compensation are complex.  Faure (2004) contends that on the 
one side there is the argument that a structured approach whereby victims are confident that they 
will get some compensation following flooding sends the wrong signal and is potentially detrimental 
to the uptake of household financial solutions (i.e. insurance, self-insurance) or preventive 
measures.  However, on the other hand there is an argument that while ad hoc compensation 
creates “legal uncertainty” (Faure 2004, p. 21) it also has the potential for flexible responses via 
different terms and conditions and amounts of compensation to be provided after different events 
which have had different impacts.   Establishing an appropriate balance between different burden-
sharing arrangements is critical to the effectiveness and fairness of the approach to compensation 
payments.   
 
3.  Modern assessments of UK flood risk 
The nature and extent of flood risk will affect the distribution and severity of all the burdens 
incurred or imposed, and here we turn to the example of flood risk in the United Kingdom, and this 
issue of fairness and effectiveness that it helps to illustrate. The level of risk may be rising globally, 
and this is certainly judged to be the case in the UK and that conclusion should be seen as the 
context to the policy shifts we describe below.  Much effort has been devoted to risk assessments 
here, largely based on the National Flood Risk Assessment (NaFRA; Environment Agency, undated) 
as updated by the Adaptation Sub-Committee of the Climate Change Committee (established under 
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the Climate Change Act 2008; HM Government, 2008) and by its Climate Change Risk Assessment 
(CCRA).   
 
The Adaptation Sub-Committee (2012) has suggested that one in seven properties in the UK (3.6 
million homes and businesses) are currently at some risk of flooding although many of these 
properties are protected to a high standard. The number of properties at "significant risk"1 (with the 
flooding return period of less than 75 years) is some 300,000, after accounting for the effect of flood 
defences, and those at non-significant risk total perhaps 3.2 million. The number of properties at risk 
from floods with a return period of less than, say, one in 25 years is relatively unknown (at least to 
The public), which is unfortunate given importance of that regularity of flooding to that particular 
group of communities. 
 
The Adaptation Sub-Committee has also suggested that risk is rising, owing to two factors. Firstly, 
there is evidence that floodplain development is continuing, although little of this is against the 
advice of the Environment Agency. In the future, secondly, with climate change, risk is liable to rise 
in some quite complex ways. Some properties and households now at non-significant risk could face 
significant risk and some now off the floodplain could become at risk.  
 
But quantifying future flood risk is not straightforward. Nevertheless the UK’s Climate Change Risk 
Assessment (CCRA) has assessed possible flood frequencies and impacts to the 2080s (Ramsbottom 
et al. 2012; CCRA 2012), allowing for population growth, and the results forecast very substantial 
increases in risk: the number of residential properties at a significant likelihood of flooding would 
rise by the 2050s from 560,000 to c. 1,035,000 (i.e. c. 1.8-fold), and to c. 1.24m by the 2080s. The 
number of properties within this flood probability band in the most economically deprived areas of 
the country could rise to between 170,000 and 560,000 (2080s) (currently 70,000; i.e. a c. 5.2-fold 
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rise). In terms of the CCRA’s assessment of future flood losses, these also show large increases, 
driven by changing GDP levels rather than just climate change. Annual property flood damage would 
rise circa 2.6-fold by the 2050s and circa 3.5-fold by the 2080s, and annual insurance claims would 
rise circa 3-fold by the 2080s. 
 
The CCRA assessment also suggested, in line with the Foresight Future Flooding findings (Evans et al. 
2004), that current levels of investment in flood defences, whilst helping to reduce risks to many 
thousands of properties, are unlikely to maintain current levels of risk, given the strengths of the two 
risk-enhancing factors indicated above. They suggest that by 2035, the combined effect of increased 
investment and faster uptake of property level measures could reduce the numbers of properties at 
significant risk by half, but that this was unlikely given the relatively poor uptake of these measures 
until now. Indeed the uptake of property-level protection measures is substantially lower than that 
needed to reach all 300,000 properties that would benefit from such measures within meaningful 
timeframe of some 25 years. 
 
In summary, the most up-to-date assessment of risk of flooding in the UK suggests that both a large 
number of properties is now liable to risk, although many are protected, and that the problem is 
getting worse. The assessment also suggests that deprived communities are likely to suffer 
disproportionately from increases in flood risk. The extent of flood damage currently experienced 
remains controversial (Penning-Rowsell 2013, 2014a, b), but what appears uncontested is the 
potential for increased flooding in the future, not least owing to the fact that climate change has 
already resulted in sea level rise. In contrast our larger rivers continue to show no trend yet in rising 
flood frequencies (Marsh and Hannaford 2008). However, “significant positive trends were observed 
in all high-flows indicators over the 30–40 years prior to 2003, primarily in maritime-influenced, 
upland catchments in the north and west of the UK” (Environment Agency 2011 p. 27) but regional 
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generalisations from those small catchments (Environment Agency 2011) appears somewhat 
unsupported. 
 
4.  Sharing the burden in the UK 
4.1  A new approach to burden sharing: the Partnership Funding scheme  
  
For flood risk management in England and Wales, a very substantial change to the funding system 
took place in 2011, against the background of the forecasts of higher risk levels outlined above. The 
change was one to an arrangement promoting local/national cost-sharing from one dominated by 
central government providing virtually all investment costs in the form of a block grant to the 
Environment Agency (EA).  The significance of this change is that it introduced a far greater and 
critical element of Localism into what previously was a highly centralised arrangement, and to a 
change where the likelihood increases of the burden of this investment falling partly on those who 
would benefit from the associated risk reduction. In the context of the financial burden spreading 
approaches Table 1 (B) this highlights a shift from a national solidarity approach to one closer that of 
beneficiary pays. 
 
The block grant system remains (Figure 1), but risk reducing schemes in many cases can only 
proceed if the national contribution is complemented by locally derived resources. The new 
Partnership Funding arrangement (Defra 2011a, b) operates on a formula basis to determine the 
Flood Defence Grant in Aid (FDGiA) – how the EA block grant (provided by Defra) is to be allocated, 
scheme-by-scheme (Johns, 2011): 
£ FDGiA= H + B + E …………………………………………………………………………….. (1) 
Where (see Table 3): 
    H - is the value of qualifying Household benefits for that scheme, times the payment rate 
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B - is the value of Other Whole-life Benefits for that scheme, times their payment rate 
E  - is the number of Environmental Outcomes for that scheme, times their payment rates. 
 
Table 3 should be inserted about here. 
Figure 1 should be inserted about here. 
 
From this can be derived an Outcome Measure (OM) Score (as a %) - being the £FDGiA sum from the 
above formula divided by the scheme costs - and this metric can be used to prioritise decision-
making. Many schemes will have an OM value greater than 100%, and then the full cost is available 
from the grant. In other cases there is a shortfall: the grant fails to cover the costs and the shortfall 
needs to be met from local contributions if the scheme is to proceed. These contributions can come 
from a number of sources, with the three prime headings being a small c. £30m p.a. local levy 
collected by the Environment Agency from local authorities, the public (e.g. local authorities directly) 
and the private sector (e.g. developers or industry).   
 
One of the characteristics of this Partnership Funding is that any scheme delivering worthwhile 
benefits (as defined in the Defra policy) can receive some level of central government funding, unlike 
the situation previously where, if the scheme did not warrant proceeding by the rules then extant 
(MAFF 1999), the central government contribution was zero.  To be eligible for a grant the 
Partnership Funding (PF) score must show that there are sufficient funds available: the PF score 
must be above 100% (the score broadly is the maximum permitted grant for the scheme plus the 
local contribution divided by cost of scheme).  To receive a grant in a particular year a scheme must 
be successful in a process that prioritises funding against the PF scores and accommodates local 
choices. Regarding the latter criterion, a stated objective of Defra's policy here is to enable more 
local choice in the solutions adopted to reduce flood risk, and Regional Flood and Coastal 
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Committees now play a central part in ensuring that local choices are reflected in the programmes 
that they are now required to agree.  
 
We can now begin to see how this new funding arrangement might operate. In the expenditure 
programme for schemes active in the financial year 2012/13 there were 140 schemes (at an average 
cost of £4.078m) for which a local contribution has been potentially forthcoming, out of a total of 
398 schemes (i.e. 35%), with that contribution varying from 0.3% to 95% of total costs (Figure 2). Of 
the schemes with some proposed local contribution, the total contributions are set to be £141m out 
of total scheme costs of £585m (i.e. an average of 24.5%), representing a sizeable additional 
resource over and above that provided nationally by the general taxpayer and a major burden for 
local contributors.  One might expect that these schemes with the high local contributions are the 
smaller schemes, which they are, but the schemes without a contribution average £5.403m, or only 
32% larger by total cost than those with the local resources. Hence it is not simply the case that local 
is small and national is very much larger. 
 
Figure 2 should be inserted about here. 
 
Figure 3 again shows a wide range of contribution levels: a highly differentiated picture of different 
burden distributions. But those schemes with the highest number of deprived households do have, 
in general, the lowest contribution levels: deprived areas get the higher levels of taxpayer funded 
grant aid. Reinforcing this picture, Figure 4 shows that the communities with the higher numbers of 
deprived households covered by proposed schemes are also concentrated in the relatively 
impoverished north of the country: few are south of Birmingham and almost none is south of 
London. Thus whilst it might have been the case that partnership funding would disproportionately 
advantage the more prosperous areas more able to make those local contributions, such as in the 
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South of England, the formula given above in fact delivers quite a different pattern. This is mainly 
because that formula purposefully prioritises those schemes to be implemented in areas of financial 
deprivation by giving them higher rates of payment (Table 3). 
  
Figure 3 should be inserted about here. 
Figure 4 should be inserted about here. 
 
 
What we see here, therefore, is a concerted attempt to shift the burden of FRM in the form of 
contributions to investment away from the general taxpayer and towards those at risk and who will 
be the beneficiaries of that investment. But an important safety net appears to exist whereby it is 
not just the affluent areas that may benefit from these arrangements, as the funding formula acts in 
the opposite direction. These results, although preliminary in that the data record potential 
contributions rather than final agreements, suggest that the burden of flood risk management 
expenditure, financed by general taxation, is indeed being complemented by the newly encouraged  
local contributions2.  Schemes in the more affluent areas or where local authorities were willing to 
commit large sums are inevitably seen to be jumping the queue, owing to the contributions that are 
forthcoming there3; which areas as a result might therefore suffer by not getting the central 
government grant that their schemes deserve is unclear. 
 
4.2   The introduction of Flood Re: towards redistributing the burden of flood recovery? 
 
Internationally, there are many approaches to assisting victims in recovering their flood losses (Table 
2).  What this tells us is that there is no one solution presented here but a range of possibilities, 
which itself is a function of many factors such as history (Penning-Rowsell et al. 2014), governance 
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arrangements (i.e. the role of the state vis-à-vis insurance markets),  and a proactive vs. reactive 
philosophy. Within the UK there has been a long tradition of individual household responsibility for 
recovery from flood events and an emphasis on insurance rather than a recovery system based on 
the principles of compensation.  Flood insurance is provided by the private market and currently 
reflects the notion that the beneficiary pays in so far as individual households pay the premiums and 
are primarily responsible for their own recovery.    
 
But flood insurance cannot be commercially viable if just those at risk are the sources of premium 
income (Arnell 2000). Therefore, inherent in the approach until now are a number of cross-subsidies 
through which the burden of recovery is spread more widely than the individual household at risk 
and those making a claim. First, flood cover is sold within a bundle of different perils designed to 
spread losses more widely between risks (Table 2).  Additionally, market competition appears to 
prevent insurers from charging full actuarial-based premiums, resulting in a cross-subsidy between 
low and high risk properties with little difference between the premiums charged (Lamond et al., 
2009).  The ABI (2010) also suggest that 78% of properties at significant flood risk are under-priced 
by an average of £420 (c. €500): a very large sum when average household flood insurance 
premiums are c. £30 (c. €36).    
 
But the situation is changing. Insurers’ concerns about climate change, the prospect of new entrants 
to the market, and a realisation that higher flood defences are not sufficient to reduce future 
potential losses have led them to edge towards adopting more risk-reflective pricing as a more 
viable long-term solution than the current pattern of cross-subsidies. Various new models of flood 
insurance provision have therefore been considered (Defra 2013a) many of which would have 
fundamental impacts upon the future distribution of flood recovery burdens, principally charging 
much more to those at greatest risk.  The state could intervene here to limit such increases, on a 
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solidarity basis, but both insurers and the UK Government appear eager to maintain a private system 
of flood insurance, but for different reasons.  A private market system has the advantage that it 
places the burden of recovery on the individual, rather on the UK taxpayer (via the government); the 
disadvantages include the low penetration rates of households in the much lower income deciles 
(Figure 5). The government has been concerned not to have a larger role in recovery provision, such 
as through a state compensation schemes or state-funded or administered insurance, if the private 
market were to disappear.  Equally, the insurers have been keen to maintain a private market 
system because many of the risks (i.e. low and moderate flood risks) remain apparently profitable 
and they feared the state encroaching into other areas of their business.  
 
Figure 5 should be inserted about here. 
 
But the insurer’s concerns, listed above, meant that status quo was itself unacceptable and the new 
scheme – Flood Re - is the result of protracted negotiations between UK Government and the 
insurance industry. This scheme proposes the introduction of a pooled approach to deal with the 
higher risk properties (Defra 2013a, b). The pool will act as a reinsurance or claims pool from which 
insurers will be allowed to draw to settle claims (or a proportion of the claims) from properties at 
high flood risk from which they do not achieve an adequate premium to cover the claims they face 
(apparently c. 50% of the total number at risk4).  Those premiums (and therefore any subsequent 
claims) are to be subsidised by a levy payable by all household insurers at an annual total of c. £180 
million for each of the first five years (Defra 2013a), taken from all customers’ existing premiums.  To 
maintain the affordability of flood insurance for high risk properties the new Flood-Re system will 
effectively cap the premiums paid for high risk properties and insurers will be able to obtain 
compensation for any net losses from insuring them from the pool.   
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What is important about the new approach is that it formalises the existing cross-subsidy and is 
applied equally (i.e. the same amount) to all household insurance policies, irrespective of risk or the 
premium being charged.  The losses from the higher flood risks are spread both between all policies, 
and therefore between all flood risks, and across the insurance industry as a whole, rather than 
within one possibly vulnerable insurer.  It is this more even distribution of the high risks which is 
allowing flood insurance to remain commercially viable and therefore available to these properties, 
maintaining the previous approach whereby the lower risks subsidise the higher ones.   
 
For the most part, therefore, Flood-Re is therefore not substantially redistributing the burdens of 
recovery from flood damages: the burden of those most at risk is still being subsidised by those at 
lesser or no risk, although premiums for high risk properties will be 20% to 25% higher than today 
(Defra 2013a).  Moreover the exclusion of the most expensive 1% of properties from the pool (the 
top Council Tax5 band in England) is an attempt to remove the largest injustices in cross-subsidy and 
a movement towards redistributing recovery burdens towards those who are perceived to be more 
able to afford them.  But the pool will still be large, although limited annually to £2.5bn or a 1 in 200 
year loss (ABI 2013):  above this the UK Government assumes primary responsibility rather than the 
insurers. However, there is uncertainty about how Flood-Re will work in practice and there are many 
governance and administrative issues to determine, not least whether Flood Re is compatible with 
EU competition rules concerning State Aid6.   
 
Nevertheless, there are already some issues in terms of the distribution of flood recovery burdens. 
Newly built property (i.e. since 2009) is excluded from the pool to further discourage floodplain 
development, thereby favouring pre-existing high flood risks rather than new ones.  Additionally, 
self-help risk mitigation is not encouraged, nor is there exclusion from the pool for those who make 
repeated claims: those at high-risk repeatedly benefiting from the pool at the expense of all those at 
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lower risks.  Moreover, the new system, despite the subsidy for of high risk premiums, posits 
premiums that will still be beyond the reach of some households, who may chose not to insure. The 
burden of recovery stays with the flood victim, who may well not be able to afford the costs 
involved.   
 
Such affordability issues are likely to worsen in the future because Flood-Re is seen as a transitional 
arrangement (for approximately 20 to 25 years) and established to allow the adjustment of 
premiums towards full actuarial pricing.  In this respect Pardoe et al. (2013) have indicated that if 
flood insurance moves towards a full beneficiary-pays approach and the cross-subsidy were 
completely removed (as is intended in the future) there would be a substantial increase in the costs 
for floodplain dwellers and in particular for those financially deprived and those in private (rather 
than Local Authority) housing.  The trends appear therefore to be regressive and, ultimately, without 
care, movement towards a full beneficiary-pays approach to flood insurance may perversely 
necessitate the introduction of other state-based instruments to assist high-risk deprived 
households (and potentially also those on more moderate incomes) whilst insurers cater only (and 
very profitably) for those at low risk! 
 
5. Conclusions 
In conclusion, we can see that many countries - faced with the possibility of substantially higher 
levels of flood risk in the future - are exploring alternative intervention and hence adaptation 
strategies, not least in Europe in following the requirements of the EU Floods Directive 2007 (EU 
Directive 2007/60/EC). This forms a response to widespread concern at the rising burden that such 
increasing risk will bring; both for the communities at risk and for the general taxpayer faced with 
the increasing sums needs to counter risk and recover from flood events. Those countries with 
market-based insurance schemes for compensating flood victims for the losses that they incur are 
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also concerned about the commercial viability of such schemes, not least owing to the many 
uncertainties that inherently accompany all forecasts of rising risk. At the global level reinsurance 
provides a safety net for such schemes, but even here there is concern that this reinsurance may not 
adequately cover those most at risk (for example in developing countries), or that hard-pressed 
governments are not free of the burden of being the insurer of last resort. 
 
Whilst globally there is little consensus about the best way forward in terms of responding and 
thereby adapting to increased flood risk, our analysis shows that in the UK both the government and 
the private flood insurers have responded with new policies and proposals to concentrate somewhat 
more the financial burden of, respectively, flood risk management investment costs and insurance 
provisions on to those who are at risk and away from the general taxpayer and those who pay 
insurance premiums. The pre-existing cross-subsidies are being reduced, both for risk reducing flood 
risk management schemes and – over a long time period – for those who insure against flood losses 
though private insurance companies. In this way, from our analysis of the relevant policy documents, 
it is hoped that extra resources for risk management investment will be forthcoming (from local 
contributions from at-risk communities) and flood insurance will remain affordable, available and 
commercially viable as a major plank in managing the flood risk that the country experiences. 
 
But no definitive conclusions can yet be drawn on the key distributional impact of these changes, 
although they appear to be regressive in that affluent communities may jump the queue for risk 
reducing investment and Flood-Re favours the affluent at risk rather than the uninsured poor. As it 
is, any increase in flood frequency and severity in the UK appears likely to affect the financially 
deprived communities to a greater extent than others, not least, again, because they are less likely 
to insure. Government arrangements to prioritise their contribution to risk reducing towards these 
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financially deprived  communities is a sign that this regressive effect of floods is real and serious, and 
they are to be welcomed. 
 
Our assessment, finally, is focused on a global message, in that other countries may well learn from 
these developments in the UK and thereby inform global adaptation strategies and practices. 
However, the nature and scale of future flooding may be important here. If climate change results in 
many more minor floods, then compensation schemes, flood insurance and risk-reducing investment 
may easily adjust, not least as the pace of change is not likely to be rapid. If, in contrast, climate 
change results in more (but still rare) catastrophic events, then the arrangements now in place both 
in the UK and elsewhere may be taken by surprise and be more vulnerable.  
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1
 As defined by the National Flood Risk Assessment (NaFRA) as areas where the change of flooding in any one year 
is greater than 1 in 75 years (1.3%) (Environment Agency, undated). After this point the term significant relates 
to risks of this nature. 
2
 By 2014 the agreed and formally ‘signed off’ Partnership Funding local contributions amounted to some £60m but the 
total agreed was nearer £150m. 
3
 Alan Bell (Morpeth Flood Action Group; personal communication April 9th  2014) 
4
 Source: Daniel Johns, Secretariat, Climate Change Committee, 10.6.2014. 
5
 A local form of taxation in England, Wales and Scotland collected from all residential properties.  The tax is 
broadly related to the capital value of a property which are arranged into eight bands A-H (nine in Wales).  
6
 In 2014 this remains yet to be resolved. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1.  Taxpayer funded flood risk management investment in England 2005-15 
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Figure 2. The percentage local contribution to flood risk management costs for those schemes being 
actively promoted by the Environment Agency in 2012/13 
 
 
Figure 3. The pattern of local contributions and financial deprivation (flood risk management 
schemes being actively promoted by the Environment Agency in 2012/13) 
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Figure 4. The location of English flood risk management schemes with the most deprived residents 
(open circles indicate zero deprived residents) 
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Figure 5. The penetration of structural and contents insurance by weekly household income deciles 
in the United Kingdom in 2011 (Source: data from Office of National Statistics 2011) 
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Table 1.  Approaches to spreading the burdens from flooding 
 
 
 
 
Flood-related 
burdens 
Spectra of burden sharing 
A. Flood risk 
 
Highly defended 
(e.g. flood risk largely 
 reduced) 
 Living with floods 
(e.g. the aim is not to prevent 
flooding but to live with the 
impacts) 
B. Financing 
flood risk 
management 
National solidarity 
(e.g. Flood risk management 
funded centrally via general 
taxation) 
 Beneficiary pays 
(e.g. measures fully funded 
by those at risk) 
C. Recovery from 
flooding 
National solidarity  
(e.g. Compensation scheme 
funded by taxation) 
 Beneficiary pays 
(e.g. Actuarial based private 
insurance market)  
D. Responsibility 
for flood risk 
management 
decision-making 
Centralised  
(e.g. Decisions are taken flood 
risk professionals centrally 
with little public input) 
 Individual at risk household 
(e.g. It is up to the household 
to decide how to manage 
their own risk) 
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Table 2.  The approaches to compensation and insurance within different national flood recovery 
systems  
 
 APPROACHES TO COMPENSATION 
 
 
 
 
No state 
compensation 
provided
1
 
Ad hoc 
compensation 
(i.e. only 
implemented in 
legislation or 
provided at the 
time of event) 
Ex-post compensation 
(i.e. schemes are 
enshrined in 
legislation/policy but 
no fund established 
prior to event) 
Ex-ante 
compensation  
(i.e. schemes 
enshrined in 
legislation and fund 
established prior to 
event permitting a 
reserve) 
A
P
P
R
O
A
C
H
ES
 T
O
 IN
SU
R
A
N
C
E 
No (little) flood 
insurance available 
  Netherlands (sea and 
river)
2
 
Canada (most flooding) 
 
In
su
ra
n
ce
 p
ro
vi
d
e
d
 v
ia
 t
h
e
 p
ri
va
te
 m
ar
ke
t 
Optional
3
 
individual flood 
cover (risk-
reflective) 
Taiwan 
Germany 
Italy 
Australia 
  
Optional 
composite 
cover (bundled 
with other 
perils)   
Portugal* 
Brazil 
 
Germany 
Australia 
 
Austria 
 
Compulsory 
inclusion of 
cover in a 
package 
Netherlands 
(rainfall and 
SWF) 
United Kingdom 
(pre-2015) 
   
Pooled flood
4
 
insurance (with no 
state guarantee) 
 
Norway 
United Kingdom 
(post 2015) 
   
Pooled flood 
insurance
d
 (has a 
state guarantee) 
France 
Denmark (sea 
flooding) 
 
  Belgium
5
 
State-run
d
 (and 
subsidised) flood 
insurance scheme 
Spain
6 
 
United States   
Sources: After Priest (2014). 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Where it is unknown whether a country has state compensation - these have been placed in this category but signified by 
* 
2
 There is one policy available for flooding but premiums are high and uptake is limited. 
3
 Whether optional or compulsory relates to whether there is a choice whether cover for flooding can be taken out, if flood 
is taken out, 
4
 These strategies may also have some private market involvement, however insurance is not solely provided on this basis. 
5
 Although there are ex ante schemes established in Belgium, in practice financing is provided both ex ante and ex post (i.e. 
the fund is topped up if funds prove to be inadequate).   
6
 Although there is some insurance written by the private market so that it could be considered to be a pooled-type system 
with a state guarantee. 
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Table 3.    The new payment rates for the Partnership Funding arrangement used in England (Source: 
Adapted from Defra 2011a) 
 
Outcome 
Measure (OM) 
Qualifying outcomes/benefits Payment rate 
OM1 Present value of the whole life benefits of the 
current proposed investment, less benefits or 
payments associated with the outcome 
measures below. 
£0.556 per £1.00 of qualifying 
benefit (i.e. 5.56%) 
 
OM2 
The Number of households protected against 
flood risk: 
 
In the 20% most deprived areas £0.45 per £1.00 of benefit 
In the 21% to 40% most deprived areas £0.30 per £1.00 of benefit 
In the 60% least deprived areas £0.20 per £1.00 of benefit 
 
OM3 
The number of households better protected 
against coastal erosion 
 
In the 20% most deprived areas £0.45 per £1.00 of benefit 
In the 21% to 40% most deprived areas £0.30 per £1.00 of benefit 
In the 60% least deprived areas £0.20 per £1.00 of benefit 
OM4 Statutory environmental obligations  
Hectares of water-dependent habitat created 
or protected 
£15,000 per hectare 
Hectares of inter-tidal habitat created £50,000 per hectare 
Kilometres of protected river improved £80,000 per km of river bed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
